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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY CORPORATION
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 970110-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
ROBERT L. MURRAY
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(f) of Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that

killing a domestic animal without cause or need constitutes
mistreatment?
2.

Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that

killing a domestic animal without cause or need is unreasonable
or inhumane (where the actor used an unfamiliar weapon; the actor
lacked focus in using the weapon/ and the act was committed in a
residential area, in the presence of neighbors)?
There are two applicable standards of review.

The first is

applied to factual findings and the other to conclusions of law.

1

As to factual determinations, the standard of review is one of
clear error.

State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994)

(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)).
Conclusions of law, on the other hand are reviewed for
correctness.

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Provo City Code § 8.02.030(1)and(2).

Cruelty to Animals

Prohibited.
The following are unlawful:
(1) To maim, disfigure, torture, beat, mutilate, burn
or scald, or otherwise mistreat any animal.
(2) To destroy any domestic animal except in a
reasonable and humane manner.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Robert L. Murray was arrested September 1,1995,
and charged with Cruelty to Animals in violation of Provo City
Code §8.02.030, Provo City Code, a Class B misdemeanor.

On

November 22, 1996, a bench trial before the Honorable Fred D.
Howard resulted in Defendant's conviction.
sentenced on February 6, 1997.

Defendant was

On February 20, 1997, Defendant

filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court,
commencing this action.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On September 1, 1995, at approximately 1:00 p.m. a Provo
City police officer was dispatched to Defendant's residence on a
report of shots fired (Tr. at 57-58).

At the scene, officers

discovered a shotgun, shells, and a small, sandy-colored cocker
spaniel which had been shot to death (Tr. at 61-67).

A

responding officer described the puppy as having a partially
severed left front paw, as well as severe head and chest wounds
(Tr. at 67).
According to neighbors, a shot was fired, followed by the
sound of a puppy crying or yelping (Tr. at 17, 37). Neighbors
then looked in Defendant's back yard and saw the wounded animal
(Tr. at 37). Upon failing to successfully kill the dog with his
initial shot, Defendant set the shotgun down and returned to his
apartment for new ammunition (Tr. at 118). Approximately fifty
seconds later, the dog's yelping was silenced by a second shot
(Tr. at 18) .
Other facts relevant to Defendant's conviction for cruelty
to animals are efficiently stated in Judge Howard's findings of
fact:
1.
The dog in question was not ill, or sick, or
suffering from any debilitating problem.
2.
The evidence is undisputed in terms of what
factually occurred. The offense occurred on September
1,1995 in Provo City, within city limits. The
defendant, Robert L. Murray, did shoot the firearm two
times, which shooting is confirmed by his own
testimony. The firearm that was discharged was a 123

gauge shotgun, and the defendant shot it with the
intention of killing his dog.
3.
This conduct understandably caused some alarm
and fear and concern to defendant's neighbors.
4.
The evidence, which is uncontroverted, shows
that the defendant intended to use the shotgun to kill
the dog.
5.
The defendant was suffering in this
particular instance from some emotional frustration,
despondency, worry, or stress, but he was not under
some diminished capacity which would impair ability to
formulate the intent to kill the animal.
6.
The defendant's anxiety was not such that it
would mar his ability to exercise rational thought or
impair his ability to formulate intent, which in this
case was the intent to dispatch the dog.
7.
There is no evidence that shows that
defendant by nature or habit was cruel to or would
mistreat animals, either the particular animal in
question in this case or other dogs.
8.
The defendant's action in this case was
deliberate, it was conceived, it was voiced to a
neighbor. The defendant did not have the specific
intent by use of the shotgun to actually torture or
shoot the animal with the intent of maiming it. The
defendant failed to kill the dog which he intended to
do, probably with one blast from the shotgun, and
simply botched the job, based on his lack of focus or
his distressed state.
9.
Notwithstanding the foregoing finding, the
ordinance provides that an individual may destroy a
domestic animal, which this dog was, in a reasonable
and human manner. Destroying an animal inhumanely
violates the ordinance. The law protecting animals
from mistreatment does not allow for a person to kill
an animal without cause or need even if the killing is
swift and without suffering to the animal. Such an
action is not humane because it violates the policy
considered in light of all the circumstances.
10. The killing of the dog in this case was
without cause, even though the defendant had the design
of doing so swiftly and without suffering by using a
shotgun. Such was an inappropriate action, and
constituted extreme mistreatment.
(R. 50-52).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant was convicted of Cruelty to animals in violation
of Provo City Code § 8.02.030.

Although Defendant attempts to

pigeon-hole the entire basis of the conviction into §8.02.030(2),
the trial judge made clear that the conviction was also based on
§ 8.02.030(1). The willful actions of Defendant on September 1,
1995, amply demonstrate mistreatment of an animal.

Further, the

manner in which Defendant destroyed the animal was both
unreasonable and inhumane.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONVICTING DEFENDANT OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS
A.

Defendant failed to act in a reasonable or humane manner in
killing his dog
The gravamen of Defendant's appeal is based on a narrow

interpretation of the term ^manner' as used in subsection two of
Provo City Code 8.02.030.

In fact, the trial judge made clear

that the conviction was based on both subsection one and
subsection two.

Nonetheless, it is appropriate to begin

with a

statutory analysis of subsection two.
Subsection two prohibits destroying "any domestic animal
except in a reasonable and humane manner."

Defendant claims that

the term ^manner' should only apply to the intended
killing the animal.

method of

However, even the definition of ^manner'
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provided in Defendant's brief fails to support such a narrow
interpretation:
Webster's Dictionary defines "manner as it is
applicable here as either "a characteristic or
customary mode of acting" or "a mode of procedure or
way of acting." Merriam Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary (Tenth Edition) at 708, (Defendant's Brief
at 13).
" :. he instant case, a xway of acting' ~~
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Many other factors also combine to render the Defendant's
act J
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Shooting such c
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To begin, the dog was in goo^d

:: . '5 -.either ~ -^-asonable nor humane

-

Defendant asked
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only

"two or three people" if they would take care of it (Tr. at

113) . Such de minimis placement efforts are certainly not
reasonable or humane as a ^customary mode of acting' when killing
a domestic animal.
Further, Defendant chose to dispatch the animal with an
unfamiliar, borrowed weapon (Tr. at 116, 117). Defendant also
admitted that he ^wasn't focused' when he initially shot the
animal, severing its paw (Tr. at 117) . These facts indicate the
absence of a reasonable xmode of procedure.'
shot the dog in the presence of neighbors.

Finally, Defendant
Naturally, this

caused alarm and fright, as well as emotional distress in those
who witnessed and heard the animal's suffering.
While there are no recorded cases which mirror the facts of
the instant matter, it is obvious that the needless killing of
dogs is enjoined under an ordinance prohibiting cruelty to
animals.

Defendant's entire basis of appeal rests on the claim

that subsection two (2) is exclusively concerned with an actor's
choice of lethal instrumentality.

Under Defendant's

interpretation of the ordinance, a person would be perfectly
within his rights to purchase the entirety of a pet store's
livestock and summarily kill the same, so long as the banner or
destruction' was relatively quick and painless.
Clearly, by enacting an ordinance against cruelty to
animals, the Provo City Council did not wish to create a legal
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passengers who used herds of buffalo for target practice, leaving
the carcasses to rot on the Western plains.
These same values lead parents of immature young children to
discipline their youth for the indiscriminate killing of small
animals such as birds, squirrels, and so on.

The needless

killing of animals is no less wrong because the individual
intends the pain of such death to be minimal. At trial, Judge
Howard stated the following:
. . . I think it's probably — even Mr. Means
[Defense Counsel], as he indicated — a general
consensus that caring of animals in this fashion is
such that it would raise public outrage (Tr. at 146).
Appellee does not here attempt to suggest that animals enjoy
an unqualified right to life.

Rather, it is the right to kill

animals which is regulated by Provo City Code in §8.002.030.
Judge Howard stated the following:
I don't believe that the law provides for a person
to kill an animal without cause or need, even if swift
and without suffering. Such an action is not humane,
because it's violating the policy considered in light
of all the circumstances.
An illustration would be could a neighbor simply
pick off his neighbor's dogs one by one, knowing that
the dogs and animals would be killed swiftly and
humanely and without suffering. I do not believe that
is the intent of the law (Tr. at 149).
"Statutory terms should be interpreted and applied according
to their commonly accepted meaning."
1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Souza, 84 6 P.2d

By using language such as

^otherwise mistreat any animal', it is clear that the City
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Vernon F. (Rick) Re •:;:;£ 3
Attorney fcr Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were delivered to Thomas Means and
Margaret Lindsay, attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, at Aldrich,
Nelson, Weight & Esplin, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo
UT 84603-0200 this
/
day of December, 1997.

Vernon F. (Rick) Ro;
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